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MISUSING TEXTUALISM:
A FURTHER REPLY TO PROF. KAHN
Prof. Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law, 202-352-8244,
sbclawprof@aol.com
Because readers have already endured four separate articles,
two by Prof. Douglas A. Kahn and two by me, debating the
interpretation of Internal Revenue Code Section 67(e)(1), I am
reluctant to respond to Prof. Kahn’s rejoinder, which appeared in the
Tax Notes issue of January 18. 1 Nevertheless, our disagreement
implicates the judicial craft of two current U.S. Supreme Court
members, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Sonia
Sotomayor. I therefore feel it important to answer Prof. Kahn’s latest
contentions, recognizing my duty to be as brief as possible.
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Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Judge Sotomayor’s Tax Opinions,’’ Tax Notes,
Aug. 3, 2009, p. 474, Doc 2009-15953, or 2009 TNT 146-12; Douglas
A. Kahn, ‘‘Rudkin Testamentary Trust — A Response to Prof.
Cohen,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 21, 2009, p. 1263, Doc 2009-19184, or
2009 TNT 180-10; Stephen B. Cohen, ‘‘Whom Do You Trust? A
Reply to Prof. Kahn,’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 9, 2009, p. 711, Doc 200923081, or 2009 TNT 216-7; Douglas A. Kahn, “It Is Logic Rather
Than Whom You Trust: A Rejoinder to Prof. Cohen,” Tax Notes, Jan.
18, 2010, p. 372.
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Section 67(e)(1) limits a trust’s deduction for costs except costs
“[that] are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the
. . . trust and [that] would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in . . . trust.” 2 Chief Justice Roberts added the word
“customarily” to the statute. He read the exception as applying to
trust administration costs “[that] would not have customarily been
incurred if the property were not held . . . in trust.” 3 On the other
hand, Associate Justice Sotomayor, at the time a court of appeals
judge, interpreted the exception to apply to trust administration costs
that could not have been incurred if the property were not held in
trust. 4 In effect, she read the exception to apply to trust
administration costs “[that] would not ever have been incurred if the
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The limit consists of treating such costs as miscellaneous itemized
deductions, deductible under the regular tax only to the extent that
they exceed 2% of adjusted gross income and not deductible at all for
purposes of the alternative minimum tax.
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Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782, 789 (2008), Doc 2008-948,
2008 TNT 12-6.

4

William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Com- missioner, 467 F.3d
149, 156 (2d Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-21522, 2006 TNT 203-4, aff’d sub
nom. Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008), Doc 2008-948,
2008 TNT 12-6.
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property were not held . . . in trust.” In effect, she added the word
“ever” rather than the word “customarily” to the statute.
I contended that either reading is semantically plausible. I did
express a personal preference for Associate Justice Sotomayor’s
reading because it would be easier to administer. I did not assert
either that her reading was otherwise superior or that Chief Justice
Roberts’ reading was untenable.
Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, argued that Associate
Justice Sotomayor’s reading “flies in the face of the statute,”5 and
Prof. Kahn agreed. Obviously, either reading imposes some judicial
gloss on Section 67(e)(1). How then do Chief Justice Roberts and
Prof. Kahn justify their shared conclusion that the word “customarily”
can be read into Section 67(e)(1) but that adding the word “ever”
“flies in the face of the statute”?
They argued that Congress’ use of “would” rather than “could”
in Section 67(e)(1) indicates that Associate Justice Sotomayor’s
reading is necessarily incorrect. I suggested other explanations for
the use or “would” rather than “could”:
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Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787.
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It might signify a lack of consciousness about the
ambiguity inherent in the statute as written. Or it might
reflect a legislative decision not to resolve this ambiguity
and instead to allow courts to determine more specifically
how to apply the language. The logical mistake of both
Roberts and Kahn is assuming that a failure to resolve the
ambiguity through the use of the word “could” in place of
“would” necessarily implies a resolution of the ambiguity
in one way rather than another.
To repeat, Chief Justice Roberts and Prof Kahn assume that
the use of “would” necessarily implies that Congress rejected the
meaning ascribed to Section 67(e)(1) by Associate Justice
Sotomayor. I offered two alternative explanations, both plausible.
Given these plausible alternative explanations, along with the
absence of any evidence that Congress ever considered the “could”
alternative, the use of “would” cannot justify rejecting Associate
Justice Sotomayor’s reading as implausible.
Prof. Kahn and I also disagreed about the meaning of the word
“costs” in Section 67(e)(2), a companion provision to Section
67(e)(1). The meaning is relevant to whether Associate Justice
Sotomayor’s reading would make some of Section 67(e)(1)’s
language superfluous. I will spare readers an explanation of the
connection, which is available in our prior articles. What is relevant
here is our specific disagreement about the meaning of “costs.”
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I argued that “costs” in Section 67(e)(2) could be read as that
word is understood in everyday “common parlance.” Prof. Kahn
emphatically insisted that the word “costs” be given a specialized,
technical meaning and ridiculed the “common parlance” approach.
Again, as a matter of semantics, either reading is plausible.
Moreover, Prof. Kahn’s insistence that only a highly technical reading
of the word “costs” is permissible seems at odds with the position of
at least one eminent jurist, Judge Henry Friendly, who wrote:
When Congress uses a non-technical word in a tax
statute, presumably it wants administrators and courts to
read it in the way that ordinary people would understand,
and not “to draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the
bounds of the normal meaning of words.” Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617, 64 S.Ct. 1215,
1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944). 6
In truth, the language of Section 67(e)(1) is a mess. The
language is not susceptible of easy application because it refers to a
counterfactual. The language directs us to assume that the property
in question, which is in fact held by a trust, is not held by a trust. We
are then to determine whether, in those hypothetical, counterfactual
circumstances, the owner would have incurred the expenses, either
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Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S.Ct. 54, 30 L.Ed.2d 108 (1971)
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customarily or ever, depending on how we choose to interpret the
statute. Instead of applying the law to facts that have occurred, we
are asked to apply the law to counterfactuals and imagine what would
have occurred had the facts been counter to what they were. Given
such problematic language, as well as an absence of clear legislative
intent, it is unsurprising that there is more than one semantically
plausible way to read the statute.
I was moved to write about the differing interpretations of
Section 67(e)(1) by Justice Roberts’ characterization of Associate
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning. It “flies in the face of the statute,” he
wrote, suggesting a judicial activist, intent on overturning the intent of
Congress in order to pursue a private social or political agenda. I
believe that the Chief Justice should have offered more plausible
reasons for preferring his reading of Section 67(e)(1) instead of the
implausible claim that Associate Justice’s Sotomayor’s semantically
plausible reading “flies in the face of the statute.”
In her court of appeals decision, then Judge Sotomayor did
examine these two possible ways of reading Section 67(e)(1) and
explained her preference for reading the statute as if it contained the
word “ever” rather than the word “customarily.” It would make the
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statute, she argued, easier to administer, a view later endorsed by tax
experts concerned that Chief Justice Roberts’ contrary position would
create an administrative mess. 7
After my initial article appeared, I was further chagrined to read
Prof. Kahn’s response, characterizing my citation of both the
Treasury’s and the Solicitor General’s approval of Associate Justice
Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1). He wrote:
Cohen’s view that approval of a court’s holding by the
winning party demonstrates the validity of that holding is
extraordinary to the point of being bizarre (emphasis
added).
In fact, I did not claim that approval by any winning party
demonstrates the validity of the holding. The Treasury and the
Solicitor General have larger responsibilities for the fair and efficient
administration of federal law than any purely private litigant. My point
- that their approval suggests that Associate Justice Sotomayor’s
reading was semantically plausible and did not, as Chief Justice
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Lindsay Roshkind, ‘‘Interpreting I.R.C. § 67(e): The Supreme Court’s
Attempt to Nail Investment Advisory Fees to the Floor,’’ 60 Fla. L.
Rev. 961, 970-972 (2008); Dean Roy, ‘‘Is That the End? Section
67(e)(1) and Trust Investment Advisory Fees after Knight v.
Commissioner,’’ 61 Tax Law. 321, 326 (2007).
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Roberts claimed, “fly in the face of the statute” - is hardly bizarre or
extraordinary.
A principal concern of the Solicitor General, in deciding what
position to adopt in tax litigation, is practical administration of the tax
laws. The office does not want to win with a theory that the IRS
personnel in the field cannot administer. In the words of one former
Deputy Solicitor General:
In my experience in the office, administrative
feasibility was as important as revenuegrabbing. Associate Justice Sotomayor’s
interpretation has much to recommend it in
terms of ease of administration, and this is
something the Solicitor General properly takes
into account in deciding what position the
United States will advance. 8
There is, of course, nothing wrong with Chief Justice Roberts
and Prof. Kahn preferring their interpretation of the statute to
Associate Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation. But they find “plain
meaning” where none exists and too readily accuse others, who
disagree with their interpretation, of riding roughshod over the statute.
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Conversation with Albert G. Lauber, February 19, 2010.
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